Technology Empowerment and Responsible Governance: Optimization Path and Empirical Research on the Tripartite Game of Takeaway Platforms

DOI: https://doi.org/10.62517/jbm.202509114

Author(s)

Yixin Yan, Daomin Li, Ziyu Liu, Na Chen, Beibei Xu, Mei Wang*

Affiliation(s)

College of Medical Information and Artificial Intelligence, Shandong First Medical University and Shandong Academy of Medical Sciences, Tai'an, Shandong, China *Corresponding Author.

Abstract

Under the background of the rapid development of Internet technology and platform economy, the takeaway industry, being a typical multilateral market, presents a complex pattern of interest game. The takeaway platform connects consumers, merchants and riders, and while this model brings convenient consumption experience, it also exposes many problems of imbalance in the tripartite game. The contradictions between consumers' rights and interests, riders' occupational risks and platforms' responsibility boundaries are becoming more and more prominent, forming a crisis of trust and labor-management dilemma that restricts the sustainable development of the industry. Existing researches have theoretical blind spots in the design of dynamic game mechanism and innovation of platform governance paths, and there is an urgent need to build a synergistic governance framework that takes into account both efficiency and fairness. This study deeply analyzed the Stackelberg game model between takeout platforms and riders, the tripartite evolutionary game model of takeout platform-rider-consumer, and the tripartite evolutionary game model of value co-creation for stakeholders of takeout platforms. The study found that: (1) under the risk sharing mechanism, the platform could reduce the risk of riders' delivery speed by increasing the proportion of traffic risk sharing (the accident rate decreased by 18%), which verifies the positive incentive effect of the risk sharing mechanism on safe delivery; (2) through the simulation of the evolutionary game, the threshold design of the overtime compensation mechanism could form a three-party strategic Nash equilibrium, which could realize the strategic equilibrium of the platform, riders and consumers (complaint rate (23% reduction in complaint rate); (3) Based on the empirical evidence, the effectiveness of the “algorithm transparency-responsibility clarity-data security” trinity governance framework was verified. The results of the study provide effective governance ideas for the takeaway platform to deal with the tripartite relationship, offer new theoretical perspectives and practical paths to promote the healthy development of the platform economy, crack the dilemma of value distribution in the platform economy, and provide important insights into the construction of a new type of labor-management relations in the digital era.

Keywords

Takeaway Platform; Stackelberg Game; Evolutionary Game; Risk Sharing; Algorithm Transparency

References

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