STEMM Institute Press
Science, Technology, Engineering, Management and Medicine
Analysis of the Institutional Background and Potential Problems of Labor Contract Law
DOI: https://doi.org/10.62517/jel.202414214
Author(s)
Shengliang Li
Affiliation(s)
Zhengzhou University, Zhengzhou, Henan, China
Abstract
The efficient allocation of labor is of great significance to high-quality economic development. However, due to the influence of traditional thinking during the transformation of the market mechanism, some enterprises and workers have insufficient or incorrect understanding of labor relations, which has increased the labor risks of enterprises and affected the development of the market economy. Therefore, from an objective perspective, this article analyzes the institutional background of China’s Labor Contract Law, as well as the potential problems and risks that may easily arise during the implementation of the Labor Contract Law. We hope to provide some guidance and suggestions to business operators and workers to build harmonious and stable labor relations, so as to achieve long-term and stable development of enterprises.
Keywords
Institutional Background; Potential Problem; Labor Contract Law
References
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