Research on the Protection of the Rights and Interests of Small and Medium-sized Shareholders under the Dual Shareholding Structure_Vol. 1 No. 2 (JEL 2024)_Journal of Economics and Law (ISSN: 3005-5768)

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Research on the Protection of the Rights and Interests of Small and Medium-sized Shareholders under the Dual Shareholding Structure

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.62517/jel.202414235

Author(s)

Yifeng Zhao

Affiliation(s)

School of Law, Tianjin University, Tianjin, China

Abstract

Against the background of shareholder heterogeneity, dual shareholding structure is gradually favored by more companies because it can better meet different investment needs. However, because the rights and interests of small and medium-sized shareholders are easily infringed by controlling shareholders' abuse of corporate control, dual shareholding structure naturally faces many risks and controversies. How to avoid the negative impacts of dual shareholding structure, so that the system can better serve the enterprise operation and economic development, has become a matter of great concern to the academic community. This paper, by studying the two typical share forms of special voting shares and preferred shares, tries to put forward targeted rule of law thinking for improving the framework of protecting the rights and interests of small and medium-sized shareholders under the dual shareholding structure, with a view to protecting the security of investment. This paper argues that the current system mainly suffers from the defects in the allocation of rights and obligations in the system design, risk control in the process, and remedies after the fact, and proposes to optimize the allocation of rights and obligations in the shareholder structure, strengthen the risk control mechanism in the process, and broaden the remedies after the fact. Through a variety of measures, it establishes an institutional framework to guide the benign operation of shareholders' rights in the capital market, reduces the risk of infringement by special voting rights holders, and broadens the ways to protect the rights and interests of small and medium-sized shareholders.

Keywords

Dual Shareholding Structure; Small and Medium Shareholders; Rights and Interests Protection; Voting Rights

References

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