Research on the Optimization Path of Good Faith Licensing Negotiation Models for Standard-Essential Patents

DOI: https://doi.org/10.62517/jel.202514302

Author(s)

Nan Xia*

Affiliation(s)

School of law, China Jiliang University, Hangzhou, Zhejiang, China *Corresponding Author

Abstract

The licensing negotiation system for standard-essential patents (SEPs) is a core component of technological standardization and a key link in balancing technological innovation and market competition. Existing issues in the current negotiation system—such as the ambiguity of the FRAND (Fair, Reasonable, and Non-Discriminatory) principle, insufficient information disclosure, excessive declaration of non-essential patents, and opaque licensing fees—prevent genuine mutual trust and information sharing between negotiating parties, often leading to low negotiation efficiency or even deadlock. This paper combs through the practical models of good faith negotiation rules for SEPs in the United States, the European Union, and Japan, and accordingly proposes: 1) clarifying the obligation of SEP right holders and standard implementers to conduct good faith licensing negotiations; 2) learning from Japan's step-by-step licensing negotiation mechanism to guide the behavior of SEP right holders and implementers by specifying concrete negotiation steps, such as defining that both parties can initiate offers, and when the SEP right holder acts as the initiator, it should fully explain the necessary information about the patents involved in the negotiation in the offer; when the two parties negotiate specific licensing terms, the process should include both technical and commercial negotiations.

Keywords

Standard-Essential Patents; Licensing Negotiation; Good Faith Negotiation; FRAND Principles; Optimization of Negotiation Models

References

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