STEMM Institute Press
Science, Technology, Engineering, Management and Medicine
The Political Trade-off Mechanism between the Interests of Sovereign States and the Cross-border Compliance of Enterprises
DOI: https://doi.org/10.62517/jel.202514532
Author(s)
Xinhang Ju
Affiliation(s)
Harrow International School Hong Kong, Hong Kong China *Corresponding Author
Abstract
Against the backdrop of the deep integration of the global economy and the intensification of geopolitical competition, the interaction between the interests of sovereign states and the cross-border compliance of enterprises is becoming increasingly complex. This article conducts an analysis from three dimensions: theoretical logic, practical contradictions, and balance paths, revealing the core demands of sovereign state interests, the constraints on cross-border compliance of enterprises, and the dynamic game mechanism of the two in political trade-offs. Research findings reveal that the interests of sovereign states influence the cross-border behavior of enterprises through three dimensions: legal regulation, economic security, and political sovereignty. To comply with the rules, enterprises need to reconstruct their strategies within the framework of technological sovereignty, data security, and industrial security. The essence of the political trade-off mechanism is that sovereign states, while safeguarding their own interests, achieve synergy between corporate behavior and national strategy through institutional design and policy guidance.
Keywords
Sovereign State Interests; Corporate Cross-Border Compliance; Political Trade-Offs; Technological Sovereignty; Geopolitics
References
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