Procedural Dilemmas in the TRIPS Vaccine Waiver Negotiations

DOI: https://doi.org/10.62517/jel.202614228

Author(s)

Guangyi Zhu

Affiliation(s)

Law-English Department, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, China

Abstract

This study is grounded in the stark reality of global vaccine inequity during the COVID-19 pandemic, revealing the profound conflict between the intellectual property regime centered on the TRIPS Agreement and urgent public health needs. This tension highlights the structural failure of the WTO’s existing decision-making mechanisms in responding to global crises, underscoring the urgency and importance of reform-oriented research. Focusing on the procedural dilemmas exposed in the COVID-19 vaccine TRIPS waiver negotiations, this research employs case analysis to dissect how the WTO’s consensus principle and negotiation processes led to a deadlock. The study argues that the WTO’s rigid procedural framework was a key cause of the waiver’s failure and urgently calls for the establishment of a permanent public health exception and a rapid crisis-response mechanism, alongside reforms to decision-making rules through the introduction of flexible voting methods, to enhance institutional capacity for addressing future global public health emergencies.

Keywords

WTO Decision-Making Mechanism; TRIPS Waiver Agreement; COVID-19; Global Intellectual Property System; Waiver

References

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