Analysis of the Motivation and Game of Akcome Guobin's Anti-Takeover Strategy

DOI: https://doi.org/10.62517/jiem.202403206

Author(s)

Xieyuan Cui

Affiliation(s)

School of Management, Hebei University of Geosciences Shijiazhuang, Hebei, China

Abstract

With the continuous improvement of China's economic level, the living standard of the residents has been improving, so that people pay more attention to health. At the same time, the rising economic status of China has also made mergers and acquisitions (M&A) as one of the important means of capital market operation, while M&A and counter-mergers and acquisitions (CMA) are occurring frequently in China, and M&A and counter-mergers and acquisitions (CMA) are gradually becoming active in the health service industry. As a leading health management service provider, Aikang Guobin, in the face of fierce market competition and the wave of M&A in the industry, has adopted "poison pill plan", "white knight", "economic litigation" and other anti-M&A strategies against Meinian Health. In order to protect its own interests, it has adopted "poison pill plan", "white knight" and "economic litigation" against MNH. In this paper, we will analyse the motivation of Akcome's anti-M&A, the reasons why it decided to implement anti-M&A, and the strategies of the anti-M&A measures implemented. In order to investigate the anti-merger and acquisition (M&A) strategies adopted by enterprises in the face of M&A threats and their effects, we take the example of Akcome Guobin Health Checkup Management Group, analyze its anti-takeover motivation and adopt the game theory to study its anti-merger and acquisition strategies such as "Poisoned Pill", "White Knight" and "White Knight" from the perspectives of law, technology, stock market and so on." The research results indicate that the company's anti acquisition strategy is a good strategy. Akkang's anti merger strategy has a positive impact on maintaining market share, improving financial performance, and enhancing brand value. The game process between Akkang and Meinian is somewhat complex, involving information collection, risk management, cost considerations, and time dimensions.

Keywords

Anti-Merger; Poison Pill Plan; White Knight; Economic Litigation

References

[1]Zhou Limei. Research on the anti-merger strategy and economic consequences of Changyuan Group. Guangxi University, 2022. [2]Wen Lixia. Research on the implementation process and effect of hostile M&A defence strategy. Shanxi University of Finance and Economics, 2023. [3]Gong Yi; Talking about Vanke equity dispute. Times Finance, 2016(27). [4]Bai Yingying. Analysis of anti-merger and acquisition strategy of listed enterprises. China Management Informatisation, 2023, 26 (18). [5]Xu Liya. Analysis of the implementation effect of anti-merger and acquisition strategy of Akcome Guobin and the evolution of the game. Zhejiang Gongshang University, 2020. [6]Zhang Weiguo, Hu Wenxiu, Du Jinzhu. A study on bidding and timing of hostile mergers and acquisitions under white knight strategy. China Management Science, 2022, 30(07):189-200. [7]Gao Mingjun. Research on the failure of Kandar's anti-malicious M&A. Yunnan University, 2023. [8]Lin Jing, Dai Shirui, Lin Lihua. The source of failure of state-owned enterprise Han Shang Group's counter-merger of private enterprise Zall. Management Case Study and Review, 2021, 14(04):446-456. [9]Sun Shuang. Study on the Motivation, Strategy and Economic Consequences of Anti-Merger and Acquisition of Listed Companies. Central University of Finance and Economics, 2022. [10]Yu Di, Song Li. Differential game strategies for cooperative mergers and acquisitions of principal merging firms. System Engineering, 2020, 38(05):75-83