Literature Review on Game Analysis for Air Pollution Prevention and Control
DOI: https://doi.org/10.62517/jlsa.202407201
Author(s)
Xiaohong Sun*
Affiliation(s)
Shandong Jiaotong University, Jinan, Shandong, China
*Corresponding Author.
Abstract
As a serious environmental issue toward all over the world in recent years, pollution has restricted the high-quality growth of the economy and people’s life satisfaction. Focusing on the current situation of air pollution prevention in our country, government departments and pollutant discharge enterprises are the core of the prevention and control work. However, above parties generate interactive games because of different interests and demands in the practice of prevention, which always presents a situation of lack of responsibility or deviation from responsibilities. Through combing the literature at home and abroad, this paper concludes various kinds of theoretical game analysis in air pollution prevention and control, combining period characteristics of China’s specific prevention work arrangement and governance objectives. We look forward to achieving the path of pluralistic co-governance and carrying out the major decision of air pollution prevention through exploring the difference of interests among each subject.
Keywords
Air Pollution Prevention; Game; Pluralistic Co-governance
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