Game in Copenhagen Climate Conference and Future Political Paths of Countries to Control Global Warming

DOI: https://doi.org/10.62517/jmsd.202412102

Author(s)

He Zhu, Li Zhang*, Beiyun Mei

Affiliation(s)

Huzhou College, Huzhou, Zhejiang, 313000, China *Corresponding Author

Abstract

The 12-day United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen (the Copenhagen Conference) ended in near failure on 19 December 2009, postponing the conclusion of what was supposed to be a binding agreement on emissions reductions until the Mexico conference in 2010. In retrospect, the Copenhagen Conference, which has been described as the most important international conference since 1945, was marked by the prominence of China and the United States, the weakened capacity and willingness of the European Union, and a clear trend of division among the three major groups, some countries had begun to show the so-called "Sino-US joint governance" in addressing climate change(CC). The meeting was characterized by a series of ups and downs in terms of commitments, technical and financial assistance from developed countries to developing countries, and the argument of advocate or against MRV (Measurable, reportable and verifiable), all of which are reminiscent of Game Theory. Based on the Game Theory model, this article analyses the roles and positions of each country or group in the negotiation of the Copenhagen Climate Conference, and through the analysis of the game model, the article puts forward some policy paths for countries to control global warming in the future so as to turn the global CC cooperation from responsibility to action, and urging countries actively promote the low-carbon economy and fulfill international commitments.

Keywords

Game Theory; Climate Politics; the Copenhagen Climate Conference, Kyoto Protocol; the Bali Road Map; Policy Paths

References

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