Discussion on the Salary System for Leaders of Railway Non-Transport Enterprises

DOI: https://doi.org/10.62517/jmsd.202512627

Author(s)

Haohui Zhu1,*, Cheng Chi2, Ting Ye1

Affiliation(s)

1Labor and Health Department, China Railway Shanghai Bureau Group Co., Ltd., Shanghai, China 2Transport & Economics Research Institute, China Academy of Railway Sciences Co., Ltd., Beijing, China *Corresponding Author

Abstract

The performance evaluation of enterprise leaders has always been an important task in deepening the income distribution system, an important content of state-owned enterprise reform, and an important means of stimulating the vitality of state-owned enterprises. This paper summarizes requirements and the practical application in railway bureau group companies, analyzing the current situation of salary composition, assessment methods, salary levels, and salary payments for heads of non-transport railway enterprises. It identifies existing problems and, based on the current performance evaluation system and practical experiences of the Shanghai Bureau Group's non-transport enterprise leaders, proposes optimization suggestions for performance evaluation from the perspectives of salary structure, salary level, assessment methods, and distribution relations. These suggestions aim to support the advancement of salary reform in the non-transport sector of the railway industry.

Keywords

Railway; Non Transportation Enterprises; Responsible Person; Performance Appraisal

References

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