Strategic Choices for Southeast Asian Nations to Mitigate Risks from a Strategic Hedging Perspective: A Case Study of China-Thailand Railway Construction
DOI: https://doi.org/10.62517/jmsd.202612205
Author(s)
Xiayue Cao
Affiliation(s)
Nanjing Agricultural University, Nanjing, Jiangsu, China
Abstract
Based on hedging strategy theory, this paper constructs a“system–unit–cross-level” analytical framework to examine the hedging role of the China–Thailand Railway in Thailand’s strategic risk management. The study finds that: (1) The China–Thailand Railway represents a proactive choice by Thailand in response to the uncertainties arising from Sino–US strategic competition. By adopting a leverage-based hedging strategy-using neutrality as the pivot, strengthening project control as the lever arm, and dynamically shifting between cooperation and precaution as the application of force-Thailand integrates engagement and balancing, avoids the risks of excessive dependence on a single major power, and seeks to maximize national interests. (2) A four-stage analysis of the project’s development shows that the hedging nature of the railway has been jointly shaped by great power competition at the system level, domestic political conditions and interest bargaining at the unit level, as well as cross-level interaction mechanisms. (3) By managing the “pivot” position of transnational infrastructure projects, adjusting control over the “lever arm,” and precisely applying “cooperation” and “precaution,” Thailand has transformed external risks generated by great power competition into strategic opportunities to enhance its regional hub status and national power. In doing so, Thailand has consolidated its role as a hub on the Indochina Peninsula and achieved a dynamic balance between risk minimization and interest maximization.
Keywords
China–Thailand Railway; Hedging Strategy; Levels-of-Analysis Perspective; Great Power Competition; Strategic Risk Governance
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