The Governance Effect of Short Selling Mechanism on Information Disclosure

DOI: https://doi.org/10.62517/jse.202611206

Author(s)

Yingzi Wang

Affiliation(s)

School of Economics and Management, Hainan Normal University, Haikou, China *Corresponding Author

Abstract

This research takes A-share listed companies in China from 2013 to 2023 as the research sample, and empirically tests the impact of the short sale mechanism on the timeliness of annual report disclosure of listed companies by constructing a Difference-in-Differences (DID) model, with a total of 27035 valid observations obtained after sample screening. The results show that the short sale mechanism significantly increases the lag of annual report disclosure and reduces the timeliness of information disclosure of listed companies, and this conclusion still holds after robustness tests such as excluding the 2020 special sample and adopting the Tobit regression model. From the perspective of transmission mechanism, reducing information asymmetry and increasing analyst attention play a partial mediating role in the above impact, which can alleviate but not offset the disclosure delay effect caused by the short sale mechanism. Further heterogeneity analysis reveals that the delayed effect of short-selling mechanisms on annual report disclosure was significantly observed only in state-owned enterprises and those with higher internal control quality. This study enriches the achievements in related fields and provides empirical reference for supervision and enterprise practice.

Keywords

Short Sale Mechanism; Timeliness of Information Disclosure; The Temporal Lag of Annual Report Release; DID Estimation Strategy; Mediating Effect

References

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