A Study on the Relationship Between Short-Selling Mechanisms and Corporate Audit Fees
DOI: https://doi.org/10.62517/jse.202611307
Author(s)
Suna Pan
Affiliation(s)
School of Art and Design, Jinshen College, Nanjing Audit University, Nanjing, Jiangsu, China
Abstract
As a crucial institutional arrangement in capital markets, the impact of short-selling mechanisms on corporate auditing behavior is a current research focus in the fields of finance and auditing. This paper centers on the relationship between short-selling mechanisms and corporate audit fees. After systematically reviewing relevant domestic and international literature and elucidating the core theoretical foundations, an empirical research framework is constructed. By formulating research hypotheses, selecting sample data, and establishing an econometric model, the paper thoroughly examines the mechanism through which short-selling mechanisms influence audit fees, as well as the heterogeneous characteristics of this relationship.The results indicate that the existence of short-selling mechanisms significantly influences corporate audit fees, with this effect transmitted through specific mediating channels and exhibiting heterogeneous variations across different corporate characteristics and institutional environments. The findings of this study not only enrich theoretical research on the economic consequences of short-selling mechanisms and the determinants of audit fees but also provide valuable policy implications for capital market regulation and auditing practices.
Keywords
Short-Selling Mechanism; Audit Fees; Empirical Research; Intermediary Effects; Heterogeneity Analysis
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