Research on the Regulation of the Abuse of Market Dominance of the "Haozan Agreement" on the Beike Platform_Vol. 3 No. 2 (JBM 2026)_Journal of Business and Marketing (ISSN: 3005-5717)

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Research on the Regulation of the Abuse of Market Dominance of the "Haozan Agreement" on the Beike Platform

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.62517/jbm.202609208

Author(s)

Yuxi Li

Affiliation(s)

China Jiliang University, Hangzhou, China

Abstract

The "Haozan Agreement" was launched by Beike platform, ostensibly providing value-added services to property owners, but in reality, it is a tool for the platform to seize the market and mark urgently sold properties through self-preferential behavior. This paper takes the abuse of market dominance by the agreement as an entry point, and uses literature research, case analysis, etc., to address the problems such as the unscientific market dominance definition standards of current Internet real estate intermediary platforms in China and the lack of regulation of the Haozan Agreement, drawing on the experience of the MLS system, integrating current market definition methods, and determining qualitative and quantitative market dominance definition standards, It is clear that the "Haozan Agreement" has abusive behaviors that infringe upon the interests of consumers and disrupt the competitive order, and ultimately proposes regulatory strategies such as confirming the agreement as invalid or ordering it to be suspended and modified, and opening up the common system for housing transactions for co-governance.

Keywords

Internet Real Estate Agency Platform; Beike Platform; Haozan Agreement; Abuse of Dominant Market Position

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